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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  aim of  this  work  is  to  determine  whether  the  accounting  information  provided  by construction
and  real  estate  ﬁrms  in  Spain  reﬂects  the  real economic  activity,  during  upswings  and  downturns.  A
relationship  is  found  between  economic  conditions  and  ﬁnancial  reporting  in a continental  European
country  such  as Spain.  Although  there  is a  relationship  between  real  housing  price  growth  and  ﬁnancial
accounting  measures,  real  estate  companies  seem  to show  an  artiﬁcial  position,  since  they  only  present
a  relationship  with  Return  on Assets  (ROA)  based  on low  quality  income  (accruals).  Therefore,  a  different
ﬁnancial  position  inﬂuences  a different  behaviour  in these  two  similar  sectors.  In  fact,  some  signs  alerting
of  possible  risk  in  real estate  ﬁrms  are  shown.
© 2014  ASEPUC.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
La  actividad  económica  real  y  la  información  contable  en  las  empresas
espan˜olas  del  sector  de  la  construcción
alabras clave:
ctividad económica real
IB
recios de la vivienda
estión del resultado
r  e  s  u  m  e  n
El  objetivo  de  este  trabajo  es  analizar  si  la  información  ﬁnanciera  de las  empresas  constructoras  e inmobil-
iarias reﬂeja  la  realidad  económica,  tanto  en  épocas  de  bonanza  como  en  épocas  de  crisis.  Los  resultados
muestran  que existe  relación  entre  la  situación  económica  real y  la  información  ﬁnanciera  de  las  empre-
sas.  Aunque  hay  relación  entre  el crecimiento  real del precio  de  la  vivienda  y  las  variables  contables,  las
empresas  inmobiliarias  parecen  mostrar  una  situación  artiﬁcial,  dado  que solo  presentan  relación  con  lampresas inmobiliarias y de la construcción
variable  rentabilidad  económica,  la cual  está  basada  en  resultados  de  baja calidad  (devengos).  Por  con-
siguiente,  estos  2  sectores  similares  que  se encuentran  en  una  posición  ﬁnanciera  diferente  se  comportan
también  de  forma  diferente.  Este  trabajo  evidencia  algunos  signos  de  alerta  sobre  el  riesgo  existente  en
las empresas  inmobiliarias.
©  2014  ASEPUC.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Este  es un  artículo  Open  Access  bajo  la  licencia∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: antonia.madrid@upct.es (A. Madrid-Guijarro).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2014.10.002
138-4891/© 2014 ASEPUC. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open acce
y-nc-nd/4.0/).CC BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The research interest in the study of economic cycles has
increased recently due to consecutive international economic
crises and downturns (Bertomeu & Magee, 2011; Callao & Jarne,
2011). However, the revision of previous literature reveals a lack
of studies focused on the relationship between macroeconomic
ss article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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onditions and ﬁrms’ accounting information. Only a few papers
Brown and Ball, 1967 and Guenther & Young, 2000) have inves-
igated the effects of macroeconomic features on ﬁrms accounting
nformation. Our main purpose is to ﬁll this gap by analysing the
elationship between real economic activity and the main eco-
omic and ﬁnancial measures.
The economic crisis and the inﬂuence that construction activ-
ty has on the world economy and, particularly, on the Spanish
conomy, make it interesting to focus this paper on both con-
truction and real estate ﬁrms. Construction activity is responsible
or an important part of the economic growth in the last decade
n Spain, Europe and America. Most of the American downturns
ince World War  II were preceded by substantial problems in hous-
ng (Leamer, 2007). In Spain, according to Seopan (2008) between
996 and 2007 the gross added value associated with the construc-
ion industry grew at an average rate of more than 5%, although
007 was the last year of a very long phase of expansion. Even
uring 2007, the gross added value, directly and indirectly associ-
ted with this sector, was 18.6% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product).
urthermore, 20% of employment was attributed to this industry.
yuso and Restoy (2007) highlight the important role played by
he housing market during recent years, as it was an indicator of
he general prospects of many industrialised economies. Conse-
uently, we study construction and real estate ﬁrms in Spain during
 period characterised by economic downturns and upswings. Thus,
ur time period allows us to cover the last year of a crisis (1996),
n upswing period that includes a bubble, and the beginning of the
urrent crisis (2007).
Since economic and ﬁnancial structures are different between
onstruction and real estate companies (Gill & Giner, 2013), our
aper analyses the effects of macroeconomic factors separately for
ach industry. Furthermore, depending on the stage of the cycle,
rms may  behave in a different manner. Johnson (1999) concludes
hat earnings response coefﬁcients are larger in expansions (credit
runch periods) than in recessions (reliquiﬁcation periods). All this
an lead to different practices of earnings management, which may
islead ﬁnancial reporting users.
This research is of interest due to several reasons. First, stud-
es that consider the relationship between economic activity and
ompanies’ ﬁnancial reporting are scarce. In addition, we  use
everal proxies for economic activity and a set of accounting vari-
bles. Second, this paper focuses on ﬁrms related to construction
ctivity, which is one of the mainstays of the Spanish economy,
s well as an indicator of the economic prospects. Furthermore,
e analyse a continental European accounting country such as
pain; studies on non-Anglo-Saxons countries are less frequent
n the accounting literature. Third, in studying two similar sec-
ors devoted to construction activity, their economic conditions
hould be similar and, consequently, their behaviour too. However,
 different economic and ﬁnancial structure may  result in a dif-
erent behaviour. Therefore, we will be able to gain insight into
his issue, by studying why they behave in a particular manner.
ourth, in order to study the strategies in terms of earning manage-
ent, this research presents a broad view, since it also takes into
ccount estimations of “real earnings management”. This method-
logy has not been applied to Spanish data so far. In sum, this
aper provides empirical evidence to understand why the general
conomic development was not reﬂected in some ﬁnancial indi-
ators before the crisis in the property sector, and supports the
mportance of a contextual analysis of ﬁnancial statement informa-
ion. Our results are useful for several economic agents including
enders and creditors, since they allow these agents to identify
he behaviour of construction and real estate ﬁrms in Spain dur-
ng economic downturns and upswings. In fact, our conclusions
ay  be interesting in order to achieve an appropriate business risk
valuation.dad – Spanish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 21–30
The remaining sections of the paper are organised as follows:
Section 2 presents the background and the research questions,
where the effect of real economic activity on accounting informa-
tion is highlighted; Section 3 describes the methodology used in
this analysis, which includes the sample characteristics, and the
variables; Section 4 reports the main results and Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Economic activity and accounting information. Research
questions
Previous research, although scarce, indicates that there is a
relationship between economic activity and ﬁrms’ accounting vari-
ables. Ball and Brown (1967) studied the association between the
earnings of an individual ﬁrm, the earnings of other ﬁrms in its
industry and the earnings of all ﬁrms in the economy. They ﬁnd
that 35–40 percent of the variation of annual earnings can be asso-
ciated with the variation of all ﬁrms’ earnings, whereas a 10–15
percent can be associated with the industry average. Since then,
little research has dealt with the relationship between economic
conditions and ﬁrm accounting information.
Guenther and Young (2000) found that because of institu-
tional differences, this relationship may  vary across countries. They
provide evidence of a strong relationship between earnings and
the underlying economic reality in Anglo-Saxon countries. While
in continental European countries there are incentives to reduce
earnings volatility, in Anglo-Saxons countries the main aim is to
satisfy shareholders’ needs in order to decrease information asym-
metry in relation to managers. Johnson (1999) studied the earnings
persistence through the business cycle considering 53,324 quar-
terly earnings announcements in the seventies for American ﬁrms.
He concluded that earnings persistence is lower in recessions
than in expansions (when investment opportunities are high). The
importance of analysing the accruals and cash ﬂow components
of earnings has been traditionally studied by the accounting lit-
erature (Sloan, 1996). Underlying this interest is that accruals are
less likely to recur in the future. Along the same lines, Bernstein
(1993) indicates that the accrual system involves higher degrees of
subjectivity than the determination of cash ﬂow; in other words,
“a company with a high level of net income and a low cash ﬂow
may be using income recognition or expense accruals criteria that are
suspect”. Finally, Trombetta and Imperatore (2014) considering a
sample composed of 5.964 U.S. listed companies during the years
1996–2011 concluded that it is important to take into account if the
ﬁrms are suffering a situation of ﬁnancial distress when analysing
the relationship between business cycle and accounting informa-
tion characteristics; in this sense, they indicate that the dynamics
of ﬁnancial crises and business cycles do not fully overlap. These
authors found that as the ﬁnancial crisis becomes more intense,
managers are more willing to engage in earnings management
practices.
We study Spain, a code-law country and both listed and non-
listed ﬁrms related to Spanish construction activity. These two
characteristics can inﬂuence the relationship between account-
ing features and real economic activity. Spain is a code-law and
bank-oriented country where information asymmetry problems
are solved through insider communication. This fact can lead to
a lower demand for disclosure, which can result in a weaker rela-
tionship between accounting measures and real economic activity.
This relationship may  be weaker in the case of non-listed ﬁrms.
Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) indicated that earning manage-
ment is more pervasive in private ﬁrms than in public ﬁrms. Even
other studies (Arnedo, Lizarraga, & Sánchez, 2007; Coppens & Peek,
2005) ﬁnd that income decreasing actions are associated with pri-
vate companies.
ntabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 21–30 23
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Fig. 1. GDP and real housing price growth during the period 1996–2007. GDP: GrossJ.C. Navarro-García, A. Madrid-Guijarro / Revista de Co
Although previous research indicates that accounting variables
nd economic activity move together (Jin, 2005), several research
uestions are posed:
 Is a general measure of economic activity appropriate for all sec-
tors?
 What role do housing prices play in the business cycle of con-
struction activity?
 Do construction and real estate ﬁrms behave similarly?
 Does the behaviour of ﬁrms change during downturns and
upswings?
Economic growth represents the real economic activity of a
ountry. As indicated by Guenther and Young (2000) GDP is the
ost comprehensive measure of a country’s economic activity,
ince it comprises the total market value of all ﬁnal goods and ser-
ices produced in a country in a year. We  use real GDP growth rate,
hat is, the percentage change in GDP measured in constant prices.
However, certain industries may  have special characteristics
hat do not ﬁt well with GDP. Construction activity is one of
he most strongly cyclical activities, growing more than aver-
ge during upswings and contracting more during downturns. In
ddition, the housing cycle lags behind the general business cycle,
ince the building period in Spain may  last between 18 and 24
onths (Seopan, 2008) and, therefore, a change in the general situa-
ion takes a certain time to affect construction sector. Prices usually
epend on the law of supply and demand and, consequently, house
rices should be related to economic activity (Girouard & Blöndal,
001).
Construction and real estate ﬁrms should be similarly affected
y house prices and general economic growth. In fact, the activity of
eal estate ﬁrms and more than 75% of construction ﬁrms is focused
n buildings. Therefore, when housing prices grow, both construc-
ion and real estate companies should beneﬁt from an increased
emand. However, a notable difference is that while economic
rowth is based on real transactions of goods and services, house
rices may  reﬂect a speculative situation rather than real ﬂuctu-
tions in economic activity. The OECD (2005) notes that although
ouse-price and business-cycle turning points roughly coincided
rom 1970 to 2000, the housing price boom is strikingly out of step
ith the business cycle; speciﬁcally, prices are overvalued in Spain,
s well as in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
Finally, economic conditions may  affect ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position.
n Spain, mainly real estate ﬁrms, bought land at high prices dur-
ng the bubble. This fact brought about an increasing indebtedness.
s indicated by Penman (2003), bubble periods create unreason-
ble expectations and managers make misguided consumption and
nvestment decision; in the end, debt burdens become intolerable.
panish ﬁrms that carried out property development activity could
e affected by this circumstance. Speciﬁcally, Gill, Fernández, Giner,
nd Martínez (2010) indicated that, during the bubble phase, real
state companies increased signiﬁcantly both their ﬁnancial and
heir operational risk. In this period, land stock increased consid-
rably at the same time as land prices grew substantially above
ousing prices. This situation was able to bring about a huge deﬁcit
etween cash ﬂow from operations and funds invested, which
as covered with external ﬁnancing. Thus, there is evidence of a
ifferent economic and ﬁnancial structure between construction
nd real estate companies, which even advises to use industry-
ocused models to predict corporate failure (Gill & Giner, 2013). All
hese circumstances may  inﬂuence not only the behaviour during
ownturns and upswings, but also a different behaviour between
onstruction and real estate ﬁrms.Domestic Product growth in real terms; PVMV: Housing price growth in real terms
according to the Housing Ministry (Ministerio de la Vivienda); PVST: Housing price
growth in real terms according to the Appraisal Society (Sociedad de Tasación).
3. Research design
Similar to Guenther and Young (2000), we use Pearson correla-
tion coefﬁcients, examining correlations between several ﬁnancial
accounting indicators (Return on assets (ROA), cash-ﬂow, accru-
als, leverage and earnings management, and different proxies for
economic activity). We  agree with Guenther and Young (2000)
that GDP growth rate, measured in real terms, can be the most
comprehensive measure of economic activity. However, the spe-
cial characteristics of construction activity lead us to think that
the proxy growth in house prices may  also be appropriate. Con-
sequently, we have also used housing price growth in real terms,
as a proxy for the underlying economic situation. In Spain, differ-
ent entities publish data on the real estate market. The Appraisal
Society presents a statistic about the evolution of the price of the
new housing in Spain (hereafter PVST), while the Housing Ministry
provides data on the housing price considering all the appraisals
(new and old buildings) made in Spain (hereafter PVMV).
3.1. Sample
The sample is obtained from SABI database, covers the period
1996–2007, and is composed of 11,102 ﬁrm-year observations for
construction ﬁrms (Codigo Nacional de Actividades Económicas
CNAE 45) and 4522 ﬁrm-year observations for real estate ﬁrms
(CNAE 70) (Table 1).
During this period, there was  never negative growth in GDP. The
year 1996 was  the one with the lowest growth (GDP: 2.4%) (Fig. 1).
Construction activity behaved differently. The last recession took
place from 1991 to 1996, which was followed by an upswing period
(Rodríguez, 2006). This bonanza period included real growth rates
in housing prices around 15%. Therefore, this paper covers three
key moments:
- The ﬁnal year of a crisis period (1996).
- An upswing period, including a speculative bubble.
- The beginning of the current crisis (2007).
3.2. Earnings management variables
In order to study the existence of and trends in earnings man-
agement, we  use the discretionary accruals methodology and,
following Roychowdhury (2006), we  also estimate “real earnings
management”.3.2.1. Discretionary accruals
One way  to alter the earnings of a ﬁrm is to manipulate the
timing of revenues and expenses. The most widely used model in
the literature to estimate discretionary accruals is the Jones Model
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Table 1
Sample distribution by year and economic activity.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CNAE 45 501 598 517 613 693 821 952 1120 1276 1459 1580 972
302 
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otes: CNAE45: Construction ﬁrms; CNAE 70: Real estate ﬁrms.
1991). Jones’ proposition postulates that non-discretionary accru-
ls depend on the ﬁrm’s economic situation. However, this model
as been criticised due to the fact that ﬁrms with extreme levels
f performance are more likely to report misspeciﬁed, unexpected
ccruals estimated by the Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney,
995, Shivakumar, 1996).
In order to mitigate problems, and following Chan, Jegadeesh,
nd Sougiannis (2004) who indicate that the Jones Cash Flow model
s a better model for detecting earnings management than the Jones
odel, we ﬁrst estimate discretionary accruals by using the
ones Cash Flow Model (Eq. (1)):
TAit
Ait−1
= ˛0
1
Ait−1
+ ˛1
SALESit
Ait−1
+ ˛2
NCASSETSit
Ait−1
+ ˛3
CFOit
Ait−1
+ εit
(1)
here TAit : total accruals of ﬁrm i for the year t, deﬁned as the
hange in non-cash current assets minus the change in current
iabilities excluding short-term debt, minus depreciation and amor-
isation. Ait−1 : total assets of ﬁrm i at the beginning of year t.
SALESit : Change in annual revenues of ﬁrm i in year t. NCASSETSit :
evel of gross non-current assets of ﬁrm i in year t. CFOit : Cash ﬂow
rom the operations of ﬁrm i in year t, calculated as the difference
etween the ordinary income before taxes and the total accruals
Ait. εit: error terms in the different expressions.
Then, following Kasznik (1999), we control for measurement
rrors using a performance adjusted method. We  rank the discre-
ionary accruals into percentile groups by their return on assets,
ssuming that the median discretionary accrual for each percentile
roup reﬂects measurement error. We  then subtract the median
rom each unadjusted discretionary accrual in that percentile.
herefore, the proxy for discretionary accruals is the difference
etween the original discretionary accruals and the median dis-
retionary accruals for each percentile.
.2.2. Real earnings management
Several authors indicate that ﬁrms may  make decisions that
nﬂuence their ordinary activity in order to alter their level of earn-
ngs (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However,
real actions” have not received as much attention as accruals man-
gement. Papers by Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys
2008) analyse real earnings practices and their relationship with
iscretionary accruals. In this paper, we consider these practices
y studying (1) abnormal levels of cash ﬂow from the operations
CFO), (2) abnormal levels of production costs, and (3) abnormal
evels of discretionary expenses.
The normal level of cash ﬂow from operations is a linear function
f sales and change in sales (Eq. (2)). This equation is estimated for
ach activity sector and year, to obtain the abnormal CFO as the
esidual values (R CFO).
CFOit
Ait−1
= ı1
1
Ait−1
+ ı2
SALESit
Ait−1
+ ı3
SALESit
Ait
+ it (2)
here CFOit is the cash ﬂow from the operations of ﬁrm i in year
, calculated as the difference between the ordinary income before
axes and the total accruals TAit. it is the error term.
Following Cohen et al. (2008), normal levels of production costs
epend on the level of sales and change in sales in the current year
nd the previous year (Eq. (3)). The estimations are cross-sectional,392 460 543 675 747 354
distinguishing activity sector and year. The residual values from the
estimations are the proxies for the abnormal levels of production
costs (R PROCOST).
PROCOSTit
Ait
= ı′1
1
Ait
+ ı′2
SALES
Ait
+ ı′3
SALESit
Ait
+ ı′4
SALESit−1
Ait−1
+ ′it
(3)
where PROCOSTit is the production cost of ﬁrm i in year t. This
variable is understood as the cost of sold goods plus change in
inventories during the year. ′
it
is the error term.
Finally, discretionary expenses are a function of one-year lagged
sales (Eq. (4)) (Cohen et al., 2008). The estimations are cross-
sectional, distinguishing activity sector and year. The residuals from
the estimations are the proxies for the abnormal levels of discre-
tionary expenses (R DEXPE).
DEXPEit
Ait−1
= ı′′1
1
Ait−1
+ ı′′2
SALESit−1
Ait−1
+ ′′ (4)
where DEXPEit is the proxy for discretionary expenses of ﬁrm i in
year t. The information included in the section “Other operating
expenses” in the proﬁt and loss account is used as the proxy for
discretionary expenses. ′′ is the error term.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and relationships among
macroeconomic variables
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of construction and real
estate ﬁrms. Leverage has barely changed for construction ﬁrms
during the study period, but increases strongly for real estate com-
panies (from 62% to 71.2%). However, accruals are higher in real
estate ﬁrms. In fact, if we analyse jointly ROA, cash ﬂow and total
accruals, we  can observe that while construction and real estate
ﬁrms have similar ROA, the cash ﬂow is signiﬁcantly higher for con-
struction companies, at the same time as total accruals are much
lower. These ﬁndings imply that construction ﬁrms are more able
than real estate ﬁrms to generate earnings.
Regarding the macroeconomic variables, Fig. 1 provides evi-
dence of a strong and negative association between GDP and
real housing price growth. The correlation between GDP growth
and PVMV is −0.517, while the correlation between GDP
growth and PVST is −0.141. This situation is based on 3 aspects:
- In 1996, the housing market was still in crisis, with prices even
decreasing at the same time as GDP continued to grow.
- During 2001–2002, GDP growth slowed down, whereas real hous-
ing prices increased signiﬁcantly.
- From 2004 onwards, real housing prices slowed down, whereas
GDP only started to slow down in 2007.In general terms, we should expect a different relationship
between economic activity indicators and macroeconomic vari-
ables depending on the perspective analysed (GDP or housing
prices).
J.C. Navarro-García, A. Madrid-Guijarro / Revista de Contabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 21–30 25
Table  2
Descriptives.
N Mean Median Standard deviation
Panel A: CNAE 45
Construction ﬁrms
Assets (euros) 11,102 66,729,047a 12,329,010 4652E+08
Sales  (euros) 11,102 40,760,561a 12,571,985 1838E+08
Growth of sales 11,102 0.1075 0.1097 0.4532
Return on assets 11,102 0.0757 0.0617 0.07295
Leverage (debt to assets) 11,102 0.7539a 0.7978 0.1701
Cash-ﬂow 11,102 0.0463a 0.0458 0.1721
Total  Accruals 11,102 0.0120a 0.0084 0.1593
PANEL B: CNAE 70
Real estate ﬁrms
Assets (euros) 4522 1,20E+08a 41,979,926 4145E+08
Sales  (euros) 4522 25,199,230a 11,705,826 6054E+07
Growth of sales 4522 0.0823 0.0781 1.1547
Return on assets 4522 0.0782 0.0577 0.0939
Leverage (debt to assets) 4522 0.6924a 0.7505 0.2280
Cash-ﬂow 4522 0.0079a 0.0074 0.2158
Total  Accruals 4522 0.0529a 0.0386 0.1874
a Signiﬁcance of difference between construction and real estate ﬁrms <1% (Student’s t-test).
Table 3
Correlations between ﬁnancial measures and macroeconomic variables.
CNAE45: Construction ﬁrms CNAE70: Real estate ﬁrms
GDP PVMV PVST GDP PVMV PVST
Panel A
Total sample
EM −0.018 (0.055)a −0.021 (0.025)b −0.024 (0.013)b −0.011 (0.441) 0.011 (0.443) 0.008 (0.611)
EM  (abs) −0.017 (0.077)a −0.158 (0.000)c −0.164 (0.000)c −0.018 (0.225) −0.119 (0.000)c −0.115 (0.000)c
Extr 0.008 (0.401) −0.013 (0.186) −0.014 (0.139) 0.010 (0.511) 0.025 (0.099)a 0.027 (0.067)a
Roa −0.007 (0.486) 0.060 (0.000)c 0.059 (0.000)c −0.020 (0.181) 0.068 (0.000)c 0.069 (0.000)b
Lev 0.009 (0.350) 0.000 (0.991) 0.001 (0.914) −0.005 (0.738) 0.073 (0.000)c 0.073 (0.000)c
CFO 0.001 (0.907) 0.044 (0.000)c 0.037 (0.000)c −0.014 (0.349) 0.008 (0.575) 0.007 (0.638)
Accruals 0 000 (0.984) 0.001 (0.905) 0.008 (0.410) 0.009 (0.538) 0.048 (0.001)c 0.049 (0.001)c
Growth 0.046 (0.000)c 0.001 (0.952) −0.011 (0.263) −0.007 (0.642) 0.019 (0.203) 0.014 (0.334)
Panel  B
Sample excluding 2002–2004
EM −0.042 (0.000)c −0.018 (0.108) −0.033 (0.003)c −0.030 (0.098)a 0.021 (0.230) 0.004 (0.809)
EM  (abs) −0.090 (0.000)c −0.181 (0.000)c −0.211 (0.000)c −0.053 (0.003)c −0.175 (0.000)c −0.190 (0.000)c
Extr 0.000 (0.980) 0.005 (0.678) 0.594 (0.308) 0.025 (0.154) 0.033 (0.065)a 0.034 (0.054)a
Roa 0.029 (0.011)b 0.058 (0.000)c 0.067 (0.000)c 0.004 (0.839) 0.079 (0.000)c 0.085 (0.000)c
Lev 0.016 (0.171) 0.004 (0.755) 0.009 (0.408) 0.015 (0.397) 0.098 (0.000)c 0.097 (0.000)c
CFO 0.030 (0.008)b 0.048 (0.000)c 0.036 (0.001)c 0.000 (0.988) −0.019 (0.281) −0.026 (0.142)
Accruals −0 000 (0.613) 0.001 (0.953) 0.017 (0.140) 0.016 (0.385) 0.087 (0.000)c 0.098 (0.000)c
Growth 0.052 (0.000)c 0.053 (0.000)c 0.047 (0.000)c 0.005 (0.762) 0.022 (0.216) 0.023 (0.202)
Notes: GDP: Gross Domestic Product growth in real terms; PVMV: housing price growth in real terms according to the Housing Ministry (Ministerio de la Vivienda); PVST:
housing  price growth in real terms according to the Appraisal Society (Sociedad de Tasación); EM:  discretionary accruals; EM (abs): absolute value of discretionary accruals;
Extr:  extraordinary results deﬂated by average total assets; ROA: earnings before interest and taxes over average total assets; Lev: debt to total assets; CFO: cash-ﬂow deﬂated
by  average total assets; Accruals: total accruals deﬂated by average total assets; Growth: change in logarithm of sales.
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cSigniﬁcance at 10%.
b Signiﬁcance at 5%.
c Signiﬁcance at 1%.
.2. Relationships between ﬁnancial accounting measures and
acroeconomic variables
Table 3 presents correlations between ﬁnancial accounting and
acroeconomic variables. There is not a clear relationship between
DP growth and ﬁnancial accounting measures. Only sales growth
eveals a positive relationship with GDP growth in construction
ompanies. This fact can be explained because GDP grew more
hen the housing market began to move beyond the crisis. There
s also a weak, but signiﬁcant, negative relationship between GDP
rowth rate and earnings management. For real estate companies,
o ﬁnancial indicator is signiﬁcantly related to GDP growth.
However, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between real hous-
ng price growth and ﬁnancial accounting measures. In both
onstruction and real estate ﬁrms, we can observe a signiﬁcantrelationship between real housing price growth and ROA, and
between real housing price growth and earnings management. That
is, when housing prices are high, ROA is also high, whereas earnings
management is lower.
In Table 3 Panel B, the previous correlations are showed
excluding the years in which real housing prices rose over 10%
(2002–2004). The results change especially for construction ﬁrms,
which exhibit further signiﬁcant correlations between GDP growth
and some accounting measures such as proﬁtability and sales
growth. These ﬁndings give evidence about the inﬂuence of the
pricing bubble on the capacity of the accounting information to
reﬂect the real economic activity of construction ﬁrms. In the case
of real estate ﬁrms, the correlations do not change signiﬁcantly,
which raises questions as to whether ﬁnancial reporting of this type
of ﬁrm reﬂects the real economic activity.
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Table 4
Roa, CFO and accruals distribution (mean values) by year and economic activity.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CNAE 45
CFO 0.031 0.053 0.065 0.054 0.050 0.065 0.058 0.050 0.055 0.051 0.030 0.011
Accruals −0.002 −0.012 −0.014 0.003 0.010 −0.005 0.005 0.018 0.010 0.012 0.033 0.039
CNAE  70
CFO 0.011 0.036 0.028 0.004 0.005 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.016 0.001 −0.010 −0.004
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hAccruals 0.020 0.001 0.016 0.050 0.053 
otes: CNAE45: Construction ﬁrms; CNAE 70: Real estate ﬁrms.
Thus, we can ﬁnd speciﬁc characteristic for each sector. Con-
truction companies present a positive relationship between
VMV/PVST and CFO. However, the results for real estate compa-
ies show a strong correlation between real housing price growth
PVMV and PVST) and both accruals and leverage. Therefore, as the
ubble develops, CFO increased in construction ﬁrms, while real
state companies increased accruals. We  can observe in Table 4
hat, until 2005, the main component of earnings was CFO for con-
truction ﬁrms. However, for real estate ﬁrms, starting in 1999,
ccruals are much higher than CFO, to the extent that CFO becomes
egative from 2006 on. As indicated by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand
2010) (pp. 354), “when earnings are composed predominantly of
ccruals, they will be less persistent than when earnings are com-
osed predominantly of cash ﬂows”. This fact together with the
ncreasing real estate companies’ leverage lead us to think that
conomic position of these ﬁrms was weaker than that of construc-
ion enterprises. Gill et al. (2010) indicate that the growth of real
state companies was basically due to a speculative behaviour in
he sector. Speciﬁcally, they found that this behaviour was based
n increasing the gross proﬁt margin through land and work in
rogress inventories. Thus, it is likely that both CFO and sales
rowth were not associated with housing prices since the proﬁt-
bility of this sector was, to a certain extent, artiﬁcially obtained
y accruals. Accordingly, we also ﬁnd that the correlation between
xtraordinary items and the housing price growth rate is positive
nd signiﬁcant.
.3. Relationships between real earnings management and
acroeconomic variables
The correlations between real earnings management and the
nancial accounting measures are quite similar for both construc-
ion and real estate ﬁrms (Table 5).
Consistent with prior studies, abnormal accruals show a positive
orrelation with R PROCOST and a negative correlation with R CFO.
hese results may  indicate an overproduction strategy directed
owards increasing earnings. In fact, abnormal production costs
ave a negative relationship with abnormal CFO. Thus, overpro-
uction has a positive effect on abnormal accruals and a negative
ffect on abnormal CFO (Roychowdhury, 2006). Likewise, both high
everage and extraordinary items are accompanied by real earnings
anagement practices aimed at increasing earnings. For both types
f companies, the correlation between the level of leverage and
bnormal production costs is positive, and the correlation between
xtraordinary items and abnormal production costs is also positive.
e also ﬁnd that the relationship between real earnings man-
gement and several performance measures (ROA, cash ﬂow and
rowth of sales) is as expected, that is, real earnings management
ncreases when performance decreases.
Table 6 shows the relationship between real earnings man-
gement and economic activity indicators. For construction
ompanies, we do not ﬁnd any relationship between them, but
eal estate companies exhibit negative correlations between real
ousing price growth (PVMV and PVST) and abnormal CFO, as well41 0.050 0.056 0.055 0.069 0.080 0.042
as between real housing price growth and abnormal discretionary
expenses. However, the relationship is positive with abnormal
production costs. All these results indicate the intention of improv-
ing income when housing price growth increases. No relationship
is found between real earnings management and GDP growth
rate.
Overall, these results reveal that construction and real estate
ﬁrms have different strategies in relation to real earnings man-
agement. While construction ﬁrms do not use real earnings
management signiﬁcantly, real estate companies use them to
improve their income as the bubble develops. This ﬁnding indi-
cates an apparently aggressive accounting policy applied by real
estate ﬁrms.
4.4. Financial accounting measures and earnings management
variables in economic downturns
Fig. 1 indicates that during 1996 there was  a decrease in both
the new housing price and the overall housing price (new and old
buildings). Similarly, Fig. 1 shows that in 2007 the bonanza period
ended. Table 7 shows the ﬁnancial accounting measures of inter-
est in this paper during two  recession years: 1996 as last year of
crisis, and 2007 as the beginning of a downturn. To this end, we
apply mean difference tests comparing the accounting information
associated with the economic downturn with the rest of the years
(economic upswing).
The results for construction ﬁrms indicate that ROA and CFO are
lower in recession years compared to other years. Furthermore, in
2007, both accruals and earnings management are higher than the
other years. This year, construction ﬁrms probably noticed some
signs of recession and tried to conceal them through abnormal
accruals.
On the other hand, real estate ﬁrms show less sign of reces-
sion during 1996 compared to 2007. Although ROA is lower during
both recession years, in 1996, both the magnitude and the direc-
tion of abnormal accruals are lower than in other years. In addition,
real earnings management is also low compared to other years,
so that these practices seek to decrease income. These facts indi-
cate that the crisis was not so deep in 1996 for real estate ﬁrms
and, since the sample comprises mainly non-listed companies, it is
likely that ﬁrms are comfortable paying lower taxes. In fact, their
Growth Added Value (GAV) was  already positive in 1996, whereas
that of the construction entities was still negative. Therefore, the
year 1996 was  worse for construction ﬁrms than for real estate
companies.
In 2007, the recession is serious in real estate ﬁrms, as the ROA
and the negative growth of sales indicate. However, there is an
important difference with respect to construction ﬁrms: the mean
leverage has grown from 62% to about 71% as a consequence of
the bubble period. In these circumstances, 2007 presents both a
high level of and positive abnormal accruals. Furthermore, abnor-
mal  discretionary expenses are lower, indicating that ﬁrms attempt
to increase their income.
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Table  5
Correlations between “real earnings management” and ﬁnancial measures.
CNAE45: Construction ﬁrms CNAE70: Real estate ﬁrms
R CFO R PROCOST R DEXPE R CFO R PROCOST R DEXPE
R PROCOST −0.381 (0.000)c −0.575 (0.000)c
R DEXPE 0.036 (0.000)c −0.482 (0.000)c 0.058 (0.000)c −0.607 (0.000)c
EM −0.224 (0.000)c 0.097 (0.000)c −0.103 (0.000)c −0.184 (0.000)c 0.216 (0.000)c −0.140 (0.000)c
EM (abs) −0.008 (0.373) 0.079 (0.000)c 0.022 (0.022)b 0.054 (0.373) 0.004 (0.795) 0.004 (0.807)
Extr  −0.045 (0.000)c 0.020 (0.036)b 0.007 (0.491) −0.045 (0.002)c 0.056 (0.000)c −0.005 (0.750)
Roa  0.317 (0.000)c −0.331 (0.000)c 0.006 (0.552) 0.358 (0.000)c −0.221 (0.000)c −0.315 (0.552)
Lev  −0.261 (0.000)c 0.283 (0.000)c 0.000 (0.976) −0.290 (0.000)c 0.287 (0.000)c −0.028 (0.060)a
Sales 0.029 (0.002)c −0.056 (0.007)c 0.114 (0.000)c −0.002 (0.913) 0.026 (0.087)a 0.042 (0.005)c
CFO 0.915 (0.000)c −0.367 (0.000)c 0.039 (0.000)c 0.899 (0.000)c −0.564 (0.000)c 0.138 (0.000)c
Accruals −0.831 (0.000)c 0.243 (0.000)c −0.042 (0.000)c −0.831 (0.000)c 0.491 (0.000)c −0.080 (0.000)c
Growth 0.033 (0.000)c −0.086 (0.000)c 0.207 (0.000)c 0.019 (0.199) −0.030 (0.048)b 0.173 (0.000)c
R CFO: abnormal cash ﬂow; R PROCOST: abnormal production costs; R DEXPE: abnormal operating expenses.
a Signiﬁcance at 10%.
b Signiﬁcance at 5%.
c Signiﬁcance at 1%
Table 6
Correlations among “real earnings management” and macroeconomic variables.
CNAE45: Construction ﬁrms CNAE70: Real estate ﬁrms
GDP PVMV PVST GDP PVMV PVST
R CFO 0.000 (0.973) 0.000 (0.938) 0.001 (0.952) 0.004 (0.795) −0.034 (0.022)a −0.034 (0.021)a
R PROCOST 0.006 (0.551) 0.003 (0.785) 0.002 (0.818) −0.005 (0.730) 0.069 (0.000)b 0.076 (0.000)b
R DEXPE 0.001 (0.921) 0.003 (0.770) 0.003 (0.749) 0.012 (0.418) −0.045 (0.003)b −0.052 (0.000)b
(
a
ﬁ
T
Fa Signiﬁcance at 5%.
b Signiﬁcance at 1%
In sum, our results indicate that, when the crisis is beginning
2007), construction and especially real estate companies adopt
n aggressive accounting policy in order to delay its effect on the
nancial reporting.
able 7
inancial measures during economic downturns (1996 & 2007).
Panel A CNAE45: Construction ﬁrms 
Year 1996 Rest of years T test
EM −0.000 0.000 −0.12
EM (abs) 0.046 0.048 0.60
Extr 0.002 0.002 −0.38
R CFO 0.008 0.005 0.34
R  PROCOST −0.009 −0.004 −0.51
R DEXPE 0.008 0.012 −0.75
Roa 0.063 0.076 −4.03
Lev 0.745 0.754 1.19
CFO 0.031 0.047 −2.09
Accruals −0.002 0.013 −2.04
Growth 0.022 0.112 4.31
Panel  B CNAE45: Construction ﬁrms 
Year 2007 Rest of years T test
EM 0.015 −0.001 2.78
EM (abs) 0.125 0.040 21.39
Extr 0.003 0.002 0.34
R  CFO 0.003 0.006 −0.70
R PROCOST −0.008 −0.004 −0.79
R  DEXPE 0.012 0.012 −0.07
Roa 0.068 0.077 −4.08
Lev 0.759 0.753 1.00
CFO 0.011 0.050 −7.01
Accruals 0.039 0.010 5.76
Growth 0.092 0.109 −1.14
a Signiﬁcance at 10%.
b Signiﬁcance at 5%.
c Signiﬁcance at 1%.4.5. Additional resultsWe have found that ﬁnancial accounting indicators are related
to housing price growth, although we  have not found a strong
CNAE70: Real estate ﬁrms
 Year 1996 Rest of years T test
2 −0.009 0.003 −3.077c
1 0.038 0.054 −5.732c
5 −0.002 0.004 −2.262b
6 −0.006 −0.024 1.271
7 0.006 0.089 −4.570c
1 −0.002 −0.051 5.027c
5c 0.064 0.079 −2.353b
4 0.620 0.696 −4.318c
8b 0.011 0.008 0.283
1b 0.020 0.055 −2.644c
6c 0.114 0.081 0.413
CNAE70: Real estate ﬁrms
 Year 2007 Rest of years T test
0c 0.025 0.000 2.624c
3c 0.127 0.047 12.101c
2 0.003 0.004 −0.543
8 −0.008 −0.024 1.992b
4 0.087 0.084 0.174
3 −0.076 −0.046 −2.488b
5c 0.062 0.080 −4.234c
5 0.712 0.691 1.870a
1c −0.004 0.009 −1.174
6c 0.042 0.054 −1.267
0 −0.212 0.108 −4.144c
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Table 8
Construction ﬁrms’ net and gross output.
Total sample Net output Gross output
EM −0.043 (0.000)b −0.023 (0.016)a
EM (abs) −0.187 (0.000)b −0.067 (0.000)b
Extr −0.001 (0.932) 0.009 (0.329)
R  CFO −0.002 (0.850) −0.007 (0.433)
R  PROCOST 0.010 (0.319) 0.014 (0.144)
R  DEXPE 0.004 (0.702) 0.005 (0.611)
Roa 0.047 (0.000)b 0.034 (0.000)b
Lev 0.012 (0.191) 0.014 (0.148)
CFO 0.059 (0.000)b 0.019 (0.046)a
Accruals −0.029 (0.002)b 0.015 (0.117)
Growth 0.056 (0.000)b 0.064 (0.000)b
a Signiﬁcance at 5%.
b Signiﬁcance at 1%.
Table 9
Other sectors’ GDP.
GDP
Roa 0.056 (0.000)a
Sales −0.027 (0.000)a
Real sales 0.108 (0.000)a
Growth 0.057 (0.000)a
Real growth 0.085 (0.000)a
ROA: earnings before interest and taxes over average total assets; Lev: debt on total
assets; Sales: sales in logarithm terms; Real sales: sales in real terms, excluding the
inﬂation effects; Growth: change in logarithm of sales; Real growth: sales growth,
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ixcluding the inﬂation effects.
a Signiﬁcance at 1%.
elationship with GDP growth rate. This is a surprising fact, since
he economic growth rate goes up or down with the economy.
Two things may  explain this fact:
 Economic growth rate in construction activity is different from
that in other industries. Thus, the special characteristics of this
activity may  result in these ﬁrms going through different stages
as to other sectors.
 Spain is a continental European country. Guenther and Young
(2000) ﬁnd that accounting earnings in common-law countries
will be more closely related to real economic activity. Besides,
they do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
ROA and GDP growth rate in continental European countries like
Germany and France.
Net output (gross added value) of construction industry can
acilitate a more accurate view of the real economic activity in this
ector.1 However, the net output of a particular sector does not
nclude intermediate goods and services. For this reason, we have
lso studied the gross output growth in real terms, that is, the sum
f net output plus intermediate goods and services.
Table 8 provides evidence similar to that in Table 3. That is, there
s a signiﬁcant relationship not only between both net and gross
utput and ROA, but also between both net and gross output and
everal different variables. In this case, the relationship between
eal economic activity and the main economic and ﬁnancial meas-
res is stronger when used as a proxy both net and gross output
ather than GDP or housing price growth rate.The second possible motivation is studied in Table 9. We  have
ollected 162,100 ﬁrm-year observations of non-construction and
on-real estate ﬁrms during the study period. Both ROA and sales
1 In Spain, speciﬁc real estate data are not available across the whole study period.
uring most years they are included in Services, together with other different activ-
ties.dad – Spanish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 21–30
growth are positively related to GDP growth. When inﬂation effects
are eliminated from sales, we even ﬁnd a stronger relationship with
GDP growth. We  must note that Guenther and Young (2000) did
not ﬁnd such a relationship in two continental European countries
in a sample from 1983 to 1997. Therefore, it could be indirectly
deduced that reporting quality in Spain has improved during the
study period.
Therefore, this article reveals that, in Spain, there is an associ-
ation between real economic activity and ﬁrm economic position.
However, we  also show that, at least when speculative bubbles, GDP
growth rate is not a good proxy for assessing economic activity in
construction and real estate sectors. Speciﬁcities of these industries
mean that the real changes undergone by them are not well rep-
resented by a generic measure of economic activity such as GDP
growth rate. On the contrary, the changes in the accounting vari-
ables are better reﬂected by house price growth rate and, to an even
greater extent, by the GAV of the sector.
5. Conclusions
Papers about crises and downturns have increased, due to the
current international situation. In Spain, the crisis is characterised
by the role played by construction activity. In fact, it is usual
that downturns worldwide are preceded by problems in housing.
Accordingly, the aim of the present research is to examine the rela-
tionship between several accounting measures and two  different
economic activity proxies (GDP and house price growth rates), in a
sample composed of construction and real estate ﬁrms in Spain.
The results indicate that although GDP growth rate may be a
good proxy for economic activity when it deals with a general
sample of ﬁrms, it may  not be such a good proxy for construction
and real estate ﬁrms. Instead, in general terms, the relation-
ship between real housing price growth and ﬁnancial accounting
measures is signiﬁcant. Furthermore, at least for construction com-
panies, another ﬁnding is that insofar as the proxy for economic
activity is closer to the gross added value of the own  sector, the
relationship with the accounting variables is higher.
However, we  can observe differences between construction and
real estate companies. Although ROA is not statistically different
in both sectors, cash ﬂow is considerably higher in construction
than in real estate ﬁrms, whereas accruals are much higher in real
estate companies. It seems that real estate companies attempt to
present high ROA during economic bonanza. Since high ROA may
not correspond with good economic conditions in real estate ﬁrms,
it is not surprising that there is not a relationship between economic
activity and either cash ﬂow or growth of sales. Faced with low
cash ﬂow, real estate companies employed accruals, extraordinary
items and even real earnings management to increase their proﬁts.
However, construction ﬁrms probably did not need to apply such
an aggressive policy.
Regarding economic downturns, we  observe ﬁrms behaving in
a different manner depending on whether the crisis is ending or
beginning. When the crisis is ending (1996), the level of earn-
ings management is not higher than in other years. Instead, when
the crisis is beginning (2007), they attempt to raise income. Other
ﬁnancial indicators such as ROA, cash ﬂow and growth of sales
indicate the magnitude of the crisis, as compared to other non-
recessionary years.
The results of this study allow a better understanding of the
quality of ﬁnancial reporting prepared by construction and real
estate companies during different economic contexts. Although
we study two similar sectors, we  show how different ﬁrms’ ﬁnan-
cial position may lead to different accounting policies. Increasing
leverage and persistent high accruals may  be signs alerting about
enterprises in a weak ﬁnancial position. In the case of real estate
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rms, cash ﬂow was negative the year before the crisis became
vident. Our evidence is interesting for both academics and profes-
ionals, since we provide insights into the behaviour of ﬁrms during
conomic upswings and downturns. Therefore, this paper helps to
ssess business risk to economic agents.
Limitations of the study provide avenues for future research
pportunities. The study was conducted on a single country (Spain)
or several reasons. First, isolating the study to a single country
acilitates data collection and takes into account the Spanish spe-
iﬁc situation during the period. Future studies could be expanded
o other regions or other countries, allowing the generalisation of
CNAE45:  Construction  ﬁrms  
EM  Roa  Lev  Growth  CFO  
Roa  0.129  (0.000)c
Lev  −0.042  (0.000)c −0.340  (0.000)c
Growth  −0.219  (0.000)c 0.194  (0.000)c 0.098  (0.000)c
CFO  −0.430  (0.000)c 0.364  (0.000)c −0.246  (0.000)c 0.104  (0.000)c
Accruals  0.537  (0.000)c 0.066  (0.000)c 0.084  (0.000)c −0.027  (0.005)c −0.027  (0.005)
EM: discretionary accruals; ROA: earnings before interest and taxes over average total 
in  logarithm of sales; CFO: cash-ﬂow deﬂated by average total assets.
a Signiﬁcance at 10%.
b Signiﬁcance at 5%.
c Signiﬁcance at 1%dad – Spanish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 21–30 29
the results. Such studies would provide opportunities to under-
stand differences in accounting information in construction activity
during a recessionary period in the context of national culture.
Finally, this paper could be extended considering other important
accounting information qualities such as earnings persistence and
conservatism.
Conﬂict of interest
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
Appendix. Correlations among accounting measures
CNAE70:  Real  estate  ﬁrms
EM  Roa  Lev  Growth  CFO
0.098  (0.000)c
0.049  (0.000)c −0.171  (0.000)c
−0.237  (0.000)c 0.242  (0.000)c 0.044  (0.003)c
−0.389  (0.000)c 0.481  (0.000)c −0.259  (0.000)c 0.178  (0.000)c
c 0.529  (0.000)c −0.046  (0.002)c 0.191  (0.000)c −0.090  (0.000)c −0.090  (0.000)c
assets; Lev: debt to total assets; Sales: sales in logarithm terms; Growth: change
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